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특별 세미나

포퓰리즘과 민주주의

Populism and Democracy


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한국이론사회학회



Special seminar

Populism and Democracy

포퓰리즘과 민주주의



Populist Politics Spreading over the World: How to Keep Democracy from its Danger?

세계 도처에 퍼지는 포퓰리즘 정치:
그 위험에서 민주주의를 어떻게 지킬 것인가?

John Dunn
Cambridge University
United Kingdom

Professional Politics and Populism: How do they differ, Where does the Danger to Democracy lie?

직업 정치와 민주주의:
어떻게 다르며 민주주의의 위험은 어디에 있는가?

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- Moderator: Shim, Young-Hee (Hanyang Univ.)
- Discussion: Kim, Bi-Whan (SungKyunKwan Univ.) Lee, Hwa-Yong (Kyunghee Univ.)
Lim, Taekyoon (SNU) Kim, Joohyoung (SNU)

- Time: Thursday, May 31, 2018 (from 14:00 to 18:00)
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- Host:



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Why populist politics spreads in the world and How to Keep democracy from its danger

John Dunn
Cambridge University

By no stretch of the imagination is Populism a clear and distinct idea. Just because it isn't, it also cannot in principle be used to refer at all precisely to distinct phenomena or applied to any definite features of the historical world. Yet most of us today who study politics across the world and are at all concerned about what is happening in the politics of our own society have at least some idea of what is meant by the challenge of populism. Just what is that challenge? What does it arise from and from where should we see it as issuing? And, once we have answered each of those three questions as clearly as we can, how best should we try to meet it? As it is employed today, Populism is used diagnostically: to specify what is seen as a political pathology and at least to suggest how that pathology might most effectively be cured. A long time ago, in a country some distance to your north and west, Populist was a name which a set of deeply engaged political actors chose deliberately and proudly for themselves¹. It was a political boast, not a charge levelled at them by their vastly more powerful adversaries. I do not know when the term democracy entered active political speech in Russia; but I'm pretty sure that the Populists, the *Narodniki*, meant to convey by so naming themselves just the same as their contemporaries further still to the west on the European continent meant by calling themselves Democrats. Nor has what they meant drained away subsequently from the Russian language. Certainly it was still very audibly there on the sole occasion I am ever likely to find myself in the Presidential offices in the Kremlin. I did so then along with three other foreigners for an interview with the Propaganda Chief of the Russian Republic Vladislav Surkov, at that point amongst the four highest officials in the Russian government. In that interview Surkov himself began his spirited address by insisting at some length that what democracy meant was the rule of the *Narod*, that very People whose cause the Populists had championed and who, he was at pains to insist, were still just as ignorant and barbarous as their nineteenth century forebears. Doing what they would wish the government of Russia to do, he warned histrionically, would horrify the rest of the world.

The point of that little vignette is not to highlight the ruling style of Russia's political elite, which clearly views its subjects very much as Peter the Great must have done and is in that respect so strikingly continuous with their Soviet predecessors and at least in this respect even with the more progressive of the Tsarist ministers who preceded them. It is to underline the fact that what is treacherous and dangerous about what we now term populism is not the allegiance it professes and almost certainly not most of the political goals it openly acknowledges. Rather,

¹ A. Walicki, *The Controversy over Capitalism: Studies of the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969; Franco Venturi, *The Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, Tr Francis Haskell, New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1966, esp 633-708.

it is the varyingly overt or concealed prospective consequences of its political triumph.

Populism in contemporary political speech, and indeed in the would-be analytical vocabulary of the academic disciplines of political science or political sociology, is, as Thomas Hobbes might have put it, Democracy Misliked: democracy with foreseeably malignant consequences. The enemies of democracy have always accused it of threatening malignant consequences, and its friends in turn often been far blither than they should have been about the reliability of the merits it was sure to display in action. Partisan exaggeration lies at the core of political persuasion. Social scientists likewise have confused themselves far too thoroughly by now across the world about just what democracy means and how to expect it to behave² to offer clear and reliable guidance on the matter to their fellow citizens or fellow subjects.

Ever since the demise of the *Narodniki*, the category of Populism has conveyed and referred to very different things as it has moved around the map over the decades. Just what do Italian Fascism and the Third Reich, Juan Peron and his formidably protracted legacy, Marine Le Pen and her bizarre father, Nigel Farage, Chavez, Correa, Morales and Lula da Silva, Erdogan, Modi and Duterte, Orbán and Kaczynski, Beppe Grillo, Matteo Salvini and *Alternative für Deutschland*, Pablo Iglesias and Podemos, Syriza and Golden Dawn, really have in common? From what common cause can they possibly all have derived? What common threat can they possibly all pose?

Alike in contemporary political speech and in academic would-be diagnosis Populism today is applied more as a political accusation than as a factual description. What it accuses is the varyingly overt purpose to use the giddy judgment of the People to deprive themselves and their more reluctant fellow citizens of the burden and privilege of subsequent political choice – to legitimize the destruction of competitive electoral democracy through the choice and action of the Demos itself. This has certainly really happened in the past in quite a number of settings by now, extending over quite a long time, though the means through which it has done so and the circumstances which prompted the degree of cooperation the Demos proceeded to provide in different settings have varied a great deal. Between the two World Wars it was applied most plausibly on the European continent. In the second half of the twentieth century its privileged focus shifted to Latin America where it has also made a strong comeback for a time in the new millennium. Since 2000 it has spread incontinentally across the globe; and from 2008 onwards it has done so at an increasingly hectic pace. This last passage especially must certainly mean something and it has obtrusive common causes; but the dispersion and heterogeneity of the phenomena themselves is every bit as salient as their elements of commonality; and the sole challenge they pose in common to any possible political taste is the challenge to clarify political purposes and begin to see how to fight for those purposes in the world as it really now is.

Their most prominent common feature, plainly enough, is the appeal to a sense of personal danger and shared political exclusion, a sense amongst those almost none of whom themselves

² John Dunn, *Setting the People Free*, 2nd ed, Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2018; *Breaking Democracy's Spell*, New Haven:Yale University Press, 2014.

belong to it that the political class in the countries in which they live has failed, is failing and must reasonably be expected to go on failing them, and that they are effectively barred from any form of political response with a serious prospect of rescuing them from this predicament. The populist promise is precisely to secure that rescue; and the challenge of populism is the rapid rise in the numbers of those who do not merely feel that they have indeed been failed by those who have recently ruled them, but also at least hope that the populists in question, whether from the right or from the left, are far likelier to do better.

This brings out the deepest structural weakness of competitive electoral democracy as a framework for collective political action - that it can only ever work

reasonably precisely on the basis of what it can know by punishing incumbent governments for their past performance, and even then must weigh the pleasures of doing so against the slender grounds for future expectation of improvement afforded by the promises of those who now volunteer to lead them instead³. In essence the weakness of this structure is the weakness of retribution (the framing of action as an effort to alter the past) as a technique for acting upon and moulding the future. The past cannot be changed by any possible action; and, whilst it provides all the evidence we could have for how anyone is likely to act in the future, that evidence is necessarily available solely for those who have already had the opportunity to act. With some of those who have had that opportunity the evidence can be pretty ample. Anyone who votes for Silvio Berlusconi on the basis of any promise he has ever given or for Recep Tayyıp Erdoğan in the expectation that he will be a stalwart custodian of civil liberties must simply be closing their eyes to as full a range of grounds for distrust as any politician could readily supply. This is not to say that many Italian electors might not have better reasons to vote for Berlusconi or Turkish voters to vote for Erdoğan than they would to vote for any of their rivals – just that whatever those reasons might be, they could not be Berlusconi's promises or Erdoğan's tender regard for the rule of law or individual liberty.

One way to see the populist wave is just as an accumulation of impulses to retribution on a growing miscellany of current regimes, prompted by the havoc wreaked across the globe by a major cyclical crisis of the world economy, the drastic fall in economic growth in a wide variety of economies which that has prompted, and the dismaying intergenerational impact of that fall on the employment and welfare of the populations which depend on them. Insofar as that is the key causal source of the wave there could be no full response to the populist challenge which does not somehow restore their previous economic dynamism and generate on an adequate scale the resources needed to repair their social fabric. It is wholly unclear that this is even possible, and far from obvious on quite other grounds, given the precarious ecological viability of the current way of life of every wealthy society in the world, that it is even on balance desirable.

As I have tried to indicate, I am far from clear that the category of populism is a good lens for

³ John Dunn, *Situating Democratic Political Accountability*, Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes & Bernard Manin eds, *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999, 329-344.

focusing political choice anywhere ever. I doubt, indeed, that it can be, because of its extreme plasticity of reference and because of the dominance within it of yearning for a more encouraging future over apprehension at a dispiriting current reality. I see it more as a folk category which has fallen amongst and befuddled professional social scientists than as a discerning diagnostic tool of those who genuinely do understand politics far better because they lavish their lives on trying to learn how to. But, whatever its limitations as an instrument of understanding, I have not the slightest doubt that, as a folk category, populism does by now indeed pick out a very prominent and consequential field for collective political judgment, and that what it picks out is indeed a challenge to the residual political capacities of societies in which the citizens enjoy real opportunities at intervals at least to deselect peacefully and coherently those who currently happen to be ruling them, and do so composedly, and at no immediate danger to their own lives or fortunes.

How to act politically is always an intensely contextual matter. In countries which are lucky enough to possess democracy in the simple and direct sense in which the Republic of Korea happily now possesses it, the task of keeping it from danger is very different from the task of fighting fiercely for it in settings which it has never reached, or where its presence has always been precarious and the experience of it thus far too recent and too disruptive to give anyone grounds to defend it on the basis of its solid achievements.

The experience of dictatorship is seldom addictive for very long and least of all so for those with very limited capacity for submission. The society of Choson must have imposed very high levels of submission for a very long time on a large proportion of its members. But there is ample evidence that that submission irked. By the late nineteenth century it irked enough to occasion quite dramatic resistance and the habit of resistance has persisted with varying degrees of prominence up till today. To no small degree it was by such resistance that the citizens of the Republic won back the democracy it had secured at independence. It cannot reasonably be claimed that the experience of dictatorship under Park Chung Hee has done Korea nothing but harm; but the good it manifestly did do for the citizens subjected to it, and which plainly lives on today for those too young to have had to bear it in person, was bought at a bitter cost.

The legacy it left behind it has soured the political relations between different parts of the country and different groups within it and massively inhibited the capacity of Korea's citizenry to agree on and set about remedying systematically over time the features of its economic, political and even educational institutions which still inflict intense stress and often acute suffering over the different stages of their lifetimes on a population which has made itself by many measures one of the richest and most advanced societies in the world. Because of the remarkable scale of that collective achievement the challenge Populism could pose to Korea is very different to the challenges it poses by now in a country like Argentina, which it has paralysed and frozen in its development by now for at least half a century. It is very different,

too, from the distinctive challenges it poses in my own country, in Italy, in Greece, in Germany or in the United States. If the nightmare of Populism varies in horror from the Third Reich to the Venezuela Hugo Chavez left in ruins to his odious and incompetent successor, or the ungovernable squandering of human and natural resources with which the ghost of Juan Peron still haunts Argentina, to the disarray of Italy today, it does so principally because of many other continuing features of each of these societies, because of the sharp contrasts in their disruption at the points when it assumed power within them and the length of time for which it retained it. The experience which stands out is still that of the Third Reich, where the bitterness of a defeated and crushed great power and the deliberate and comprehensive ruin of the lives of most of its inhabitants,⁴ met by appalling global misfortune a uniquely dynamic, energizing and brutal ideology of national reassertion, along with an archaic and vulnerable scapegoat for the agency which lay behind their sufferings.

By no stretch of the imagination is Korea a failing society or economy, so in Korea at least the challenge of Populism, insofar as it arises at all, is bound to prove weaker. Seen by its enemies, the personnel previously accustomed to governing the state in question, Populism is less a rude assault on their governmental competence than a varyingly witting technique for accumulating and consolidating personal power in new and adhesive hands. It sets about doing so in most cases through a now familiar set of tropes – splitting the true People and the *pays réel*, invariably presented, as it was at the outset of France's first and greatest Revolution by the Abbé Sieyès,⁵ as the immense majority and all that was really effective and really mattered in its society from the unjustly and harmfully politically privileged who had recently governed it so ineffectually. The split once made, the Populists offer themselves as the sole trustworthy and prospectively effective replacement. They do so, naturally, for as long as turns out to be necessary to restore society and economy to what they should always have been, and insist accordingly on the danger of the displaced former rulers obstructing them in their pressing task, and on the consequent imperative to prevent them forcibly from attempting to do anything of the kind. This is not always wholly unrealistic. It certainly did not prove so in the original French case and has not done so quite recently in the case of Turkey, where Erdogan seized the opportunity of a clumsy attempt at a military coup and deployed it as an excuse to purge the country's courts, bureaucracy, media and universities on a vast scale and to blame it on the erstwhile ally who had made it possible for him to build his own political vehicle in the first place by protecting it against the parties and the army which had ruled Turkey so brusquely ever since Atatürk had founded the Republic. This is not a prospect from which the ill-assorted Populists now united to try their hand at governing Italy can hope to benefit, even once they have settled firmly on which of their two political parties should provide the leader in question. The immediate dangers they face, all too obviously, are more those of economic chaos and immiseration than of the Carabinieri opting to intervene ineffectually to restore Mario Renzi

⁴ J M Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, New York:Harcourt, Brace & Howe, 1920; Richard Evans, *The Coming of the Third Reich*, London:Penguin 2003;Mark Mazower, *The Dark Continent:Europe's Twentieth Century*, London:Penguin, 1999; Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1889-1936:Hubris*, London:Penguin, 2001; *Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis*, London, Penguin 2001.

⁵ Emanuel Joseph Sieyès, *What is the Third Estate?*, ed S.E.Finer,London:Pall Mall Press, 1963.

or Silvio Berlusconi, or even of the President choosing to install Mario Draghi with his formidably proven competence on a far larger stage in a government of national unity in their stead.

You can judge the degree of danger which Populism presents in one setting or another by comparing the levels of failure on the part of previous governments and by assessing the degree of resistance to the consolidation of arbitrary power in the hands of a Populist victor which the institutions and culture of the society in question is likely to pose. In neither case, as far as I can see, is the Republic of Korea particularly at risk. Even if it were, moreover, as the vast demonstrations against your previous President underlined so dramatically, it also has a quite unusual (perhaps even a unique) degree of popular capacity to resist any such outcome; and in its case, too, at least on that occasion, in the end the People in the streets managed to link hands with the highest judicial authority in the country. Other incumbents have certainly been brought down by repeated mass demonstrations: the last Shah of Iran, Hosni Mubarak, Ben Ali, even, earlier this month, in effect the long serving and well entrenched President of Armenia. But in none of these cases was the outcome not merely endorsed, but in the end effectively implemented, through the legislature and the courts acting together. It is one thing to recognize and validate a political outcome. It is quite another to cause it. Anyone can claim to speak in the People's name and in a competitive electoral democracy most serious candidates for election must at least appear to be trying to do so. But you cannot be an effective Populist against the People. If and when it chooses to speak, the most brazen of Populists must fall silent.

The reason why Populism seems such a pervasive challenge at present across the world is that so many societies are clearly failing politically at present. Above all they are failing, and have been failing for some time, economically, in the degree to which they are no longer succeeding or never have succeeded in organizing their economic life to meet the felt needs of most of their inhabitants. The greater and more protracted that failure, the greater the Populist danger; but also plainly the more urgent the need to identify who has caused it and decide on and implement a set of remedies which will reliably reverse it, meet those needs in future, and restore a vision of security and hope across the remainder of their lives to most of its inhabitants.

That and only that can keep democracy safe from the dangers of populism and that in itself is scarcely a matter for democrats to complain about. Democratic politics are not a talisman for any society's security or welfare, still less a substitute for either. They are a continuing test of its political intelligence and a permanent process of learning and forgetting: an exacting and vulnerable mode of common action, not a shared condition of passive and pre-guaranteed felicity. Some of these features to be sure are not specific to democracy. Any way of organizing government is a continuing test of political skill and a permanent process of learning and forgetting. What marks democracy out from any other form of regime is not a set of canonical institutions. It is simply the range of those it recognises as needing to learn and stave off forgetting within a determinate political unit, and the basis on which it identifies and selects them. It is its distinctive vision of the division of political labour and the premise of that vision in the distribution of entitlement to judge in the last instance what a government may and may not do in its citizens name. It does not presuppose, ludicrously, that everyone's capacity to

judge very many potentially weighty issues is as good as anyone else's, or even, more reasonably, that there is no wholly reliable way of ascertaining just how good anyone is at doing anything at all important. It merely assigns the ultimate right to judge what to do and how it is wise or permissible to do it to all adult citizens on an equal basis. It will never be obvious how best to do this, so the institutional means for realising that right must also always remain just as permanently in question. No real democrat, accordingly, can deny to any democratic regime the full right to take its own life, however grim that prospect may be: not in Algeria, not even in Egypt under Morsi. Democratic decisions are not invalidated as such by their indiscretion or even by the malignity of the motives behind them, though, like any other political decision, they can be rejected from the outside for the malignity of their content and consequences. They can lose such sanctioning authority as democracy can give them in one way and one way only – by evidence that that they were not in fact what the citizens in question chose. Populism asserts in its ideological form the fullest of titles to democracy's authority; but it has to vindicate that authority, just like any other pretender to the title, by the evidence they can offer that the citizens it appeals to have indeed chosen it. It is far better placed to do so under circumstances where it is not itself already in government. When it is, as on several consecutive occasions during Mugabe's Presidency in Zimbabwe, in Venezuela on each consecutive occasion under Maduro, in Turkey's forthcoming election, or even in Russia in Putin's regular Presidential iterations, that authority is always to some degree in question.

All incumbents have strong motives to favour themselves, and most are less than fastidious in how far they resist or succumb to these motives; but, insofar as they do succumb, the means they select for doing so make all the difference. It is one thing to bribe the electorate with one another's money, or to make promises you well know you are quite unable to keep. It is quite another to murder or jail your more effective opponents, harass their families, impound their assets or devastate the communities which you expect to support them. What confers democracy's authority is solely and exclusively free choice. It is far from clear that there has yet been a single fully democratic regime suicide.

There have been several recent studies of how best to resist the triumph of populism and the durable establishment of tyranny under its aegis⁶, and very considerably more of the processes through which it has displaced democracy in the past⁷. None look especially relevant to Korea today; but what might be at least suggestive is the evidence of what lay behind the two most spectacular and unexpected populist disruptions of the last few years- Britain's Brexit referendum and the election of President Trump. In neither case was the outcome the triumph of a well-defined and integral populist movement clearly aiming to achieve it at the point when the campaign opened. If anything, that model fitted far better the electoral victory of Emanuel

⁶ Timothy Snyder, *On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century*, London: The Bodley Head, 2017; *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe and America*, London: The Bodley Head, 2018.

⁷ The studies by Richard Evans and Ian Kershaw cited in note 4 remain among the best, though they do not simply displace Alan Bullock, Karl Dietrich Bracher or even Franz Neumann. For Italian Fascism Adrian Lyttleton, *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy 1919-1929*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973 and Martin Clark, *Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution that Failed*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972 are still excellent, as is Paul Corner, *Fascism in Ferrara, 1915-1925*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Macron's *La République En Marche*, the personal vehicle of Europe's most eloquent, self-assured and contemptuous foe of Populism's claim to be taken seriously. Britain is governed today, insofar as it is governed at all, not by Nigel Farage but by Theresa May; and only a tiny number of Americans seem to have viewed Donald Trump as a credible candidate for their Presidency at the time that he entered the lists. It is hard to think of any current career politician less plausibly populist in political style than Theresa May. What was highlighted luridly in both episodes was the depth of cumulative discredit incurred by the previous regime, in neither case since alleviated by the erratic performances of the governmental practices which proved to succeed it.

The two episodes arose within two very different constitutional structures and the outcome of one was much clearer cut than the other. The shift from one American President to the next is always imponderable in its consequences; but it is as familiar and as highly institutionalised as any political procedure in the world, hallowed by centuries of history and well defined in process, however odd some parts of that process may now look to others. The Brexit referendum was unique in many different and highly consequential respects. It was unique in the scale of consequences which it put out to direct choice by the citizens in person, and unique as yet in the unclarity of what the choice they proceeded to make is going to imply. It was uniquely democratic in form, and thus far uniquely feckless in the entire history of the British Isles in the degree to which a government chose to surrender to those who had given it the authority to govern the power to decide what it must do as a government into an indefinite future; and quite possibly for as long as it remained such.

In each case the insurgent forces which won appealed against the political agencies which had ruled them for decades beforehand, indicting them for abandoning large groups of their constituents and whole areas of the country and privileging instead the interests of foreign powers, businesses and nationals over those of their British or American counterparts. The evidence to which they pointed and which carried conviction was not the wealth and prosperity allegedly transferred abroad or the local labour supposedly displaced by hordes of immigrants, but the blighting of domestic communities and the collapsing local economies which they blamed on this transfer. There was little foundation for most of those claims in economic causality; but the blighting and collapse were real enough and in each case far more recent; and the charge of refusing to shoulder responsibility for remedying them in each case all too well founded.⁸ Combined as it was with the widely diffused awareness of the extreme and rapidly increasing concentration of wealth and income in an ever tinier proportion of citizens (or foreign residents) at the summit of the society, stagnant or declining real incomes for ever more of the population, high levels of lifetime debt for virtually everyone who has secured a higher education in the last decade, ever more prohibitive barriers to entering the housing market for those who do not already own a house, and marked consequent impairment in the expectations for their future prospects of most of those below the age of 35, this had eroded trust in the

⁸ Cf John Dunn, Specifying and Understanding Racism, Dunn, *The History of Political Theory*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1996, 148-159.

political class as a whole and opened up a huge new space for political entrepreneurship.

The threat of populism is never that it will destroy political and economic structures and processes which were previously working well for the majority of a national population. It is that it may cause each of those structures to work appreciably worse far into the future, and at worst ensure that many of them can never work again. It is hard to see that as a real threat for the Republic of Korea, not because the amateur political economy of its citizens⁹ is necessarily any more discerning than those of Britain's or America's, and certainly not because the intergenerational and geographical incidence of the opportunities it offers is plausibly any more just than it was in the United Kingdom in June 2016 or in the United States that November. It is hard because Korea is so plainly neither a failing economy nor a failing society, and because it has just chosen a government for at least acknowledging the need to address some of the more dismaying aspects of its present condition. The real economic threat of populism is the promise to implement policies which are certain to make an existing predicament far worse and perhaps irremediable, a recurrent danger in Argentina, and all too thoroughly realised by now in Venezuela today. It is a reasonable (though probably mistaken) view that something of the kind occurred through the Brexit referendum, where the winning campaign was certainly waged on the basis of a political economy which, where not deliberately mendacious, was little better than fantasy and the more pressing fear is that the next election may be won on the basis of a political economy which would not merely lower the future living standards, as the referendum itself already has, but wreck their future prospects far more systematically and permanently. But neither of these outcomes would realise the full populist threat: the durable establishment of an uninhibitedly authoritarian government, intent on dismantling the structure of civil and political liberties and displacing the rule of law by the arbitrary distribution of punishments and rewards on its own behalf by the ruling power.

The enemies of Brexit (of whom I am certainly one) would point to the sections of the society and areas of the country which voted against it- the younger and the better educated, the residents of its most successful and cosmopolitan cities (the metropolis, Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester) - and at least suggest that these represented the most effective elements in society and economy and those best equipped to ensure its future welfare through their continuing achievements. But the referendum also showed, precisely by the reciprocal of that distribution, how far Britain was in June 2016 from Sieyès's claims for France in the Spring of 1789.¹⁰ Not only was it not the immense majority of the population. It proved not to be a majority at all; and by that point it very clearly had no clear and reliable remedy for what had made most of the country's territory and more than half its population so much less equipped to face their futures. It makes no sense to blame that on populism; and it is wiser and altogether more

⁹ John Dunn, *Social Theory, Social Understanding and Political Action*, Dunn, *Rethinking Modern Political Theory*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1985, 119-138; *Reconceiving the Character and Content of Modern Political Community*, Dunn, *Interpreting Political Responsibility*, Cambridge:Polity, 1990, 195-219; *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy:Compatibilities and Contradictions*, John Dunn, ed, *The Economic Limits to Modern Politics*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 193-215.

¹⁰ Emanuel Joseph Sieyès, *What is the Third Estate?* ed S.E.Finer, London:Pall Mall Press, 1963, 51-58. For all three of Sieyès' pamphlets in 1789 see Emanuel Joseph Sieyès, *Political Writings*, ed Michael Sonenscher, Indianapolis:Hackett, 2003.

honourable to recognize in it, in Britain's case, populism's principal cause. So viewed, even Britain's most indisputably populist party, UKIP, the United Kingdom Independence Party, founded exclusively to achieve Britain's departure from the European Union and rapidly disintegrating as soon as the decision to leave had been taken, was plainly, whilst it lasted in reality, far more symptom than it was cause.

The risk of realising the full populist nightmare could only be real in an economy and polity which were already failing very drastically indeed and destroying whatever social coherence it had ever mustered quite directly by doing so. Because politics is always so densely contextual¹¹, and because it matters most when there is a real possibility of sliding out of a routine politics which many agencies at least partially understand into a crisis where no one can reasonably be confident of judging what might happen,¹² what the case of the Brexit referendum strongly suggests is plausibly true quite generally. Populism, if you think about it steadily, is never best seen as a potent and autonomous causal force reconfiguring the future possibilities for human beings on a very large scale. Rather, it is an externally caused outcome of cumulative pathologies in the routine politics of a particular society, and a tracer over time of just how strong and how imminent the potential for incipient crisis is across the world. So seen, it is a political style and a horizon of political ambition which can spread rapidly from context to context by mimesis, as revolutionary aspirations did in the endgame of both the First and the Second World Wars,¹³ and durably modify the outcomes of crises in at least some of the settings where it is taken up.

Koreans have more prominent reasons to remember that process than most, as they look across the DMZ; but so too do the Vietnamese and the Indonesians, and so in Europe itself also for long did the Yugoslavs,¹⁴ until their more recent bloodbath filled the screen instead. The routines cannot ever refurbish themselves and they can only be refurbished by suitably impressive political action on the part of those who choose to defend them, and by the adoption and pursuit of policies which do effectively remedy the grounds for the dismay and anger which have placed them in such jeopardy in the first place. This cannot anywhere for long be just a matter of impression management,¹⁵ central though that skill has always been to political efficacy. To remove the cause is always principally a matter of governing more effectively. In that sense the challenge of populism is simply the challenge of government itself. In a democracy at least, expertise, skill and integrity must each vindicate themselves continuously in open debate and do so as best they can in the teeth of whatever enemies fate proves to send them. Recently they have been failing notably to do so in very many settings and succeeding

¹¹ John Dunn, *The Cunning of Unreason: Making Sense of Politics*, London:HarperCollins, 2000.

¹² John Dunn, *Understanding Revolutions, Rethinking Modern Political Theory*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1985, 68-86, ; Benjamin Abrams, *An Interview with John Dunn: Modern Revolutions and Beyond*, *Contention*, 5,2, 2017, 114-131

¹³ Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1979;John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions*, 2nd ed, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1989. Christopher Bayly & Tim Harper, *Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain's Asian Empire*, London:Penguin,2007.

¹⁴ Dunn, *Modern Revolutions*, 96-120.

¹⁵ Cf Irving Goffman, *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*, Garden City, NY:Doubleday Anchor, 1959.

effortlessly in doing so in none¹⁶. And all that is before you even take account of the devastating harm to human habitat which is still accelerating remorselessly across the globe. You cannot protect democracy without protecting human lives; and you cannot protect it effectively unless you learn how to protect those lives across generations far into the future.

¹⁶ Cf Robert Kuttner, *Can Democracy Survive Global Capitalism?* New York: Norton, 2018, following the trail of Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* (1944). Or less hectically and perhaps over-sanguinely Michael Sandel, Populism, Liberalism and Democracy, *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 44,4, 353-359 2018. On the economic background see now Barry Eichengreen, *The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Professional Politics and Populism: How do they differ, where does the Danger to Democracy lie?

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This paper serves two goals. First, it is intended to be a working note. I just want to explore how we can conceptually sort out different types of populism rather than assuming populism to be homogeneous and investigate salient characteristics of each type preliminarily from an empirical perspective. In this way, I want to see when and how populism may either promote or hinder progressive social change or democracy. This requires an open approach with innovative spirit. Second, this paper focuses on the potential threat of populism to democracy. I want to take an explicit focus and conceptual strategy in this regard. To discuss about a potential threat, we need to set a clear-cut object to be studied. The political trend can always be up and down, so ambiguities frequently emerge where politics is moving forward. The object of the study needs to be more precise than an authoritarian retreat. As we find in Turkey, the reoccurrence of a military regime should be seen as a threat to democracy. In this study, I want to pay attention to the problem associated with a strong presidential rule. Thus, I want to investigate where that threat comes from in the society by conducting quantitative analysis of the citizens' survey data collected in 2014 and 2018 in Korea.

As a Research Note

I have found some interesting tendencies from my research on populism with focus on the attitudes of the citizens. I am interested in combining theory and data in empirical researches. Along this, I have wanted to study populism not from the perspective of a populist political leader defined in terms of many elements as speech, policy, strategy, ideology, motive, intension as well as the styles of communication. As a methodological commitment, this study pays attention to citizens to identify who the populist citizens are, how they are composed of, and how they respond to pertinent socio-economic and political issues.

As an empirical study, this study conducts the analysis of the collected survey data. The quantitative analysis is aimed at demonstrating clearly about the characteristics of the populist citizens, their internal groupings, and the consequences of their actions. The potential danger of populism to democracy can also be examined empirically. Needless to say, an interpretive or descriptive study of the stories of the specific populist leaders, movements, and ideologies are important. Yet the empirical study is no less important since it offers analytical knowledge of how populism works in the society.

When we study populism, we should be careful enough not to fall in the trap of political motive operating behind the use of the term populism. More often than not, the term populism already involves a negative framing. The label of populism has been applied to so many contexts for

different hidden motives. So it has become rather difficult to understand what populism really means. In South Korea, for instance, the past authoritarian governments of Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) and Park Keun-hye (2013-2017) tended to define the massive candlelight demonstrations as populist politics. The conservative media also tended to identify this movement politics as a potential threat to representative democracy. The target of populism has then moved to welfare populism, meaning that the current government expands the welfare expenses too rapidly without a master plan. Yet it is not clear whether the candlelight movement or welfare programs, as such, have something to do with populism inherently. The inflationary consequence is thus unavoidable. Furthermore, the public image of populism has become complicated during the last several years, because both the conservative and progressive camps found themselves entangled in a heavy manipulation of public opinion by means of a systematic fabrication of comments in the SNS-led on-line communication. In this situation, one cannot but conclude that both camps have converged into populist tendencies.

As an empirical study, therefore, this study wants to develop a balanced view of populism. There is no reason to take an essentialist standpoint. Whether populism works positively or negatively depends on the context of development and the issues involved. In Argentina, for instance, the meaning of populism (Peronism) was far more positive during the 1930s and 1940s than today. We should remain flexible to see when populism functions as a threat to democracy, and when it promotes democratic development.

As a research note, I want to specify how we can develop a conceptual design for an empirical study of populism. In any case, we should start from the fact that populism involves profound ambiguities and fluidities. As common characteristics of the populist outlook, however, I think we can use such variables as a strong distrust of professional politician and a strong appeal to the symbol of 'people' for the empirical study of the populist attitudes. We can confirm these tendencies out of the interaction between citizens and political leader. The next step then is to develop the items of questions adequate to measure the extent of these common characteristics. We will then be able to sort out from the empirical index of populist attitudes the populist group and the conventional group. The first refers to the group who shares populist outlook while the second refers to the group which supports the conventional idea of professional politics. In this way, we can go on and deepen the empirical analysis.

Second, I can go further to relate the study of populism to the paradigm of liberalism. This may be theoretically more inspiring but also controversial. The paradigm of liberalism can be seen as composed of political liberalism and economic liberalism. The core of political liberalism lies in the provision of basic civil and political rights, whereas the core of economic liberalism lies in the provision of competitive market institution. For an empirical study, we need to cross these two axes to sort out conceptually four categories of citizens. I will come back to this soon. I only want to say here that, as one of these four categories, the standard type of 'neo-liberal' refers to those who support the liberal market economy on the basis of the realization of political liberalism. This means that they assess the basic civil and political rights as footed in the reality and, on this political condition, advocate the value of free market and trade. In this sense, I will call them the politically stabilized neo-liberal. In contrast, another group which I

want to call ‘the politically disillusioned populist’ refers to those who reject the liberal accomplishment of the basic civil and political rights and support egalitarian economic development. In this way, we can investigate specific characteristics of this populist group in relation to liberalism.

Basic Design and preliminary Outcomes

I will then outline the research on populism in progress. First of all, this study uses the survey data collected from Seoul citizens in 2014 and 2018. <Table-1> shows the demographic characteristics of these two sets of data.

<Table-1> The demographic composition of Citizen Survey Data in 2014 and 2018

| | | 2014 | 2018 |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Sex | Male | 49.5 | 49.1 |
| | Female | 50.5 | 50.9 |
| age | 20's | 17.8 | 18.6 |
| | 30's | 19.6 | 18.7 |
| | 40's | 21.7 | 19.6 |
| | 50's | 19.5 | 18.8 |
| | 60's and over | 21.3 | 24.3 |
| Education | High School or below | 27.6 | 20.4 |
| | College graduation | 64.2 | 66.8 |
| | Post-graduate | 8.2 | 12.7 |
| Stratification | Middle strata | 54.6 | 62.8 |
| | Lower Strata | 45.4 | 37.2 |
| Supporting Political Party | Ruling Party | 51.9 | - |
| | Opposition Party | 48.1 | - |
| Ideology | Conservative | 30.1 | 28.7 |
| | Moderate | 40.0 | 29.3 |
| | Progressive | 29.9 | 42.0 |
| Total | | 100(N=1059) | 100(N=1123) |

This study follows the Hellenic (Greek) Voter Study 2015 which included a battery of questionnaires targeted to measure the attitudes of citizens towards political leaders. The Hellenic study group has collected data from 2007 concerning the demand and supply sides in elections. But they began to include the items of populism from 2015 with focus on the attitudes of citizens. Among the 8 items they used, we selected 5 items listed below


- 1) Most politicians do not care about the people
- 2) Most politicians are trustworthy
- 3) Having a strong leader in government is good even if the leader bends the rules to get things done
- 4) The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions
- 5) Most politicians care only about the interests of the rich and powerful

We then asked the respondents how much they would agree or disagree to each statement by choosing one of the suggested scaled options as “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.”

The analysis of the data has resulted in the following preliminary results.

- 1) The factor analysis of the five items above reveals a reasonably high degree of consistency. Thus, we have constructed an index of populist attitudes and divided the citizens into two groups, that is, the populist political group and the conventional political group. The populist group occupies 56.2 percent of the respondents while the conventional group does 43.8%. The former expresses distrust of professional politicians while advocating the role of the people, whereas the latter continues to trust on professional politicians.
- 2) It turns out that this divide of populism and professional politics is deeply affected by the perception of justice or fairness. This is one of the most conspicuous findings of this research in progress. 13 items of justice were included to cover various aspect of social life.

<Figure-1> Perception of social justice and populist attitude



As <Figure-1> shows, the perceived lack of justice clearly promotes the populist attitudes. The difference of the two groups is marginal only with respect to compulsory education and public medical service. Otherwise, the tendency is clear that a negative assessment of social justice promotes the populist attitude characterized by the distrust of professional politics. Indeed, this finding is well supported by the populist judgment that politicians generally care about the interests of the rich and powerful, not the ordinary people.

Another case with good point is related to the perceived importance of family background and social network capital for the individual success. The data suggests that the populist group is more sensitive than the conventional group to the aspects of social inequality anchored in the

division of “gold” spoon (rich family) and “muddy” spoon (poor family), so to speak, as often expressed in the media reports today. The metaphor of muddy spoon reflects a sense of frustration, anger, and deprivation.

To move quickly, the regression analysis of the data shows that out of the demographic factors, the variables of age and social class yield independent influence on the populist attitude to a certain extent. The model 2 in <Table-1> shows the following tendencies. 1) As one becomes older, one shows more populist attitudes. 2) The low class is more closely associated with the populist attitudes than the middle class. 3) The higher household income is, the less populist attitude is found. But the most important independent influence is found in the perception of justice and family background. This indicates that people becomes populist as they experience the lack of justice in the society and the influence of family background over individual success.

<Table-2> Regression analysis of the populist attitude

| Dependent Variable: Populism | Model 1 | Model 2 |
|---|------------------|------------------|
| age | 0.003(0.006) | 0.015(0.006)** |
| sex (woman=0, man=1) | -0.117(0.133) | -0.007(0.126) |
| marital status1 (unmarried=0, married=1) | 0.176(0.196) | 0.167(0.185) |
| marital status2 (unmarried=0, bereaved/divorced/seperated=1) | -0.360(0.308) | -0.380(0.291) |
| class (lower class=0, middle class=1) | -0.472(0.156)** | -0.318(0.148)* |
| health (good=0, bad=1) | 0.012(0.136) | 0.078(0.129) |
| housing1 (own's house=0, charter=1) | 0.036(0.168) | 0.010(0.158) |
| housing2 (own's house=0, monthly rent/etc=1) | -0.040(0.189) | -0.071(0.178) |
| education | 0.055(0.070) | 0.030(0.066) |
| household income | -0.042(0.054) | -0.070(0.051) |
| social justice | | -0.080(0.011)*** |
| conditions for success | | 0.338(0.042)*** |
| constant | 10.684(0.459)*** | 9.696(0.659)*** |

*** means $p < 0.001$, ** means $p < 0.01$, * means $p < 0.05$, + means $p < 0.1$

However, I have also found some potentially controversial aspects of populism too. Insofar as the populist attitude expresses resentment to social inequality, it is likely that the populist group sees the value of competition negatively because they would regard the market competition to be conducive to increasing than decreasing social inequality. When faced with the choice between two opposing standpoints, that is, “Incomes should be made more equal” and “We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort,” the populist group is regarded to lean more to the former than the conventional group. Furthermore, concerning the question “who should be responsible for individual life?” the populist group is regarded to attribute responsibility more to the state than the other group. However, data analysis is not consistent in this regard and shows even the opposite tendency.

Conceptual Innovations and Data Analysis

This reveals the need to look at the populist attitude with more care. To what extent populism

entails collective orientation is an open question. Perhaps, populism is not homogeneous but involves different sets of orientations. This calls for new imaginations. Thus, we decided to introduce other conceptual tools to our research of populism at the level of citizens' attitudes. One is the divide of state interest versus public interests and another is the divide of market versus welfare orientation. The first divide has cultural root in East Asia in which the role of public debate and movement has been conspicuous, as distinguished from the bureaucratic domain of state authority. The second divide may also have profound significance over the economic aspect of populism.

What we have attempted is a sort of conceptual innovation which lies in combining two axes, that is, the divide of the populist versus conventional group and the divide of state versus public interests. The four groups will then emerge. We may call them as 1) the power-oriented populist group, 2) the public-oriented populist group, 3) the power-oriented conventional group, and 4) the public-oriented conventional group. On the other hand, we can also sort out four groups by combining the divide of populist versus conventional group and the divide of market versus welfare orientation. The resulting four groups may be called as 1) the market-oriented populist group, 2) the welfare-oriented populist group, 3) the market-oriented conventional group, and 4) the market-oriented conventional group. We need to develop more theoretical reasoning over the issues of what this conceptual strategy means and presupposes.

But I would like to stick to empirical findings. The four groups are distributed almost evenly, as <the Table-3> shows. The power-oriented populist group occupies 19.7 % of the respondents (Seoul citizens), and the public-oriented populist group does 36.5%. In addition, the power-oriented conventional group occupies 21.0%, whereas the public-oriented conventional group does 22.8%.

<Table-3> Four groups by state versus public interests

| | State Interests | Public Interests | % |
|------------------------------|---|--|-------|
| Conventional Political Group | Power-oriented conventional group (236, 21.0%) | Public-oriented conventional group (256, 22.8%) | 43.8% |
| Populist Political Group | Power-oriented populist group (221, 19.7%) | Public-oriented populist group (410, 36.5%) | 56.2% |
| % | 40.7% | 59.3% | |

How do these four groups differ from each other in terms of basic demographic characteristics? In <Table-3>, ideology means the average point of ideological orientation, with the maximum point 9 in the direction of progressive orientation. Education means the percentage of those with college education and higher. Age 1 refers to the percentages of the 20s and 30s, and Age 2 refers to the percentages of the 50s and older. <Table-3> shows no significant relation to social stratification. But it shows that two public-oriented groups are equipped with higher education, and that two power-oriented groups are equipped with older generations. This means that the public-oriented populist group is better shaped in terms of education and age than the power-oriented populist group. Indeed, the populist group is not homogeneous and unitary. The public-oriented populists can be more active in promoting public interests than the power-

oriented populists.

<Table-3> Demographic characteristic of four groups


| (Unit: Score in Ideology, rest are %) | Power-oriented professional politics | Public-oriented professional politics | Power-oriented populism | Public-oriented populism |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Ideology | 4.8 | 5.6 | 4.9 | 5.6 |
| Middle class | 65.2% | 70.3% | 61.1% | 57.6% |
| Education | 75.4% | 83.6% | 74.7% | 82.2% |
| Age 1 | 32.2% | 45.3% | 29.4% | 39.5% |
| Age 2 | 47.9% | 36.3% | 49.8% | 41.0% |
| Regular workers | 32.2% | 35.1% | 31.2% | 36.1% |

High “Ideology” score means people tend to have more progressive political attitudes (range 1-9)

“Age1” includes 20’s and 30’s and “Age2” includes over 50’s

This interpretation can be supported by the findings related to the question of whether we should increase the nuclear power plant or not, as a sensitive public issue. The difference of the two groups within the populist camp is revealing. As large as 48.9 percent of the power-oriented populist group supports the increase of the nuclear power plant whereas only 32.9 percent of the public-related populist group supports it. This means that the power-oriented populists are clearly in favor of conservative policy while the public-oriented populists support a progressive approach in this regard. <Figure-2> demonstrates significant influence of the divide of state versus public interests over the issue of populism. The ways in which the power-oriented and public-oriented populist sees the world are significantly different, though both belong to the populist camp.


<Figure-2> Four value orientations and Nuclear power plant



Data analysis shows the similar tendencies concerning the question: “If North Korea refuses to give up atom bomb, we should also develop it.” The power-oriented populist group goes first to support it with 74.2 percent positive response. The public-oriented populist group is less willing to support it. Up to this point, the findings are internally consistent. Parts of the populist camp which are relatively younger and better educated tend to support public interests than state interests, and they can work as a driving force towards a progressive social change.

We have already seen in <Figure-1> above that the populist group is distinguished from the conventional group by its critical assessment of justice in many different aspects of social life. We have then moved further to distinguish the two groups within the populist camp, that is, the power-oriented populist and the public-oriented populist. How would they then be distinguished from each other in terms of their assessment of justice in the society?

<Figure-3> Two populist groups and social justice



Here we find again a consistent pattern in the relation between two populist groups and the perception of social justice. As <Figure-3> shows, the public-oriented populist group tends to be more critical than the power-oriented populist group in their respective views on justice.

The next step of analysis is concerned about the impact of the divide of market versus welfare orientation to the populist outlook. Data analysis shows the following results. First, we find the similar pattern of distribution of the four groups as before. The market-oriented populist group occupies 26.6 % of the respondents and the welfare-oriented populist group does 29.6%. In addition, the market-oriented conventional group occupies 19.5 percent while the welfare-oriented conventional group does 24.3 percent.


<Table-4> Four groups by market versus welfare orientation

| | Market | Welfare | % |
|------------------------------|---|--|--------|
| Conventional Political Group | Market-oriented Conventional group (219, 19.5%) | Welfare-oriented Conventional group (273, 24.3%) | 43.80% |
| Populist Political Group | Market-oriented Populist group (299, 26.6%) | Welfare-oriented Egalitarian Populist group (332, 29.6%) | 56.20% |
| % | 46.10% | 53.90% | |

As <Table-4> shows, the pattern of distribution of four groups is quite even. The market – oriented conventional group occupies 19.5 percent of the respondents, while the welfare-oriented conventional group occupies 24.3 percent. As to the populist camp, the market-oriented populist group occupies 26.6 percent while the welfare-oriented populist group does so 29.6 percent.


Furthermore, related to the issue of nuclear power plant, data analysis shows the difference of the two groups within the populist camp is as clear as in the case of the conventional group. As <figure-4> demonstrates, the market-oriented populist group supports the further construction of nuclear power plant most strongly. 47.3 percent of this group supports it. The welfare-oriented populist group differs significantly since only 30.6 percent supports the claim. This pattern can also be confirmed in the case of the conventional group. The divide of market versus welfare orientation yields significant influence on the issue of populism. The two groups see the world very differently though they both belong to the populist camp.

<Figure-4> Market versus welfare orientation and populism



As <Figure-5> shows, the assessment by the two populist groups of the extent of realization of justice in the society is significantly different. The welfare-oriented egalitarian populist is more critical consistently than the market-oriented populist.

<Figure-5> Two populist groups and social justice



What has come out of these analyses is a hidden relation between power orientation and market orientation, on the one hand, and between public orientation and welfare orientation, on the other, at a deeper level of social consciousness. Why this is so needs to be explored in depth. Those in favor of power (state interests) are likely to move in the direction of market orientation. In contrast, those in favor of public interest tend to be associated with welfare orientation. This is what we found from this study. But no good explanation is available. Yet it can be said that with regard to social change, the public-oriented and welfare-oriented populist group works as an enabling energy for change whereas the power-oriented and market-oriented populist group works as a constraining factor of change.

Liberalism and Populism

I now want to extend the analysis to the relation between populism and liberalism. For this, I will use the survey data collected from Seoul citizens in 2014. The demographic composition of this data was already shown in <Table-1>.

The task set before us is not simply to contrast liberalism and populism but to relate them. For this, it is necessary to develop a 2 by 2 table by combining political liberalism and economic liberalism. The economic orientation can be measured by the questions related to free market versus egalitarianism. We decided to use the following three items of questions to develop an empirical index of economic liberalism.

<Table-6> Free Market versus Egalitarianism – Index of Economic Liberalism

| Incomes should be made more equal | | | | | We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

| Private ownership of business and industry should be increased | | | | | Government ownership of business and industry should be increased | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

| The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for | | | | | People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|---|----|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |

Our conceptual strategy in the case of political liberalism differs from economic liberalism. To make it short, we are concerned about the extent to which the basic civil and political rights are realized in the country, not simply value orientation. This is more about the assessment of the political reality than the normative way of thinking by respondents. Thus, we decided to use the following three questions with the opening introduction.

Here are some things people often say about our current political system. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree.

<Table-6> The design of questions for political liberalism

| | Strongly agree | Agree | Neither agree nor disagree | Disagree | Strongly disagree |
|---|----------------|-------|----------------------------|----------|-------------------|
| People have freedom of speech | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| People have freedom of association | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Nobody needs to be afraid of arbitrary arrest | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

We then conceptually distinguished four types of actor by combining the two axes of political and economic liberalism.

<Table-7> Four types of actors by combining political and economic liberalism

| | | Political Rule | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|--|---|
| | | Positive Assessment | Negative Assessment |
| Economic Orientation | Free market Orientation | Politically Stabilized Neo-Liberal | Politically Frustrated Economic Liberal |
| | Egalitarian Orientation | Politically Stabilized liberal Egalitarian | Politically Frustrated Egalitarian Populist |

The major goal of our research is to find out where the potential threat to democracy comes from. The potential threat may be identifiable in different ways. But this research starts by identifying such threat from the support to a strong presidential rule. We thus asked the

respondents how they would feel about “having a strong president who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.” The options of response include “very good,” “fairly good,” “fairly bad,” and “very bad.” As a whole, it turns out that 43.3 percent of the respondents support a strong presidential leadership. This figure is pretty large and deserves careful attention since a strong president can be appealing particularly in the age of global risk and increasing economic polarization as we find today. Of paramount importance for an empirical research is then to find where this potential threat to democracy comes from in the society.

<Table-8> Regression Analysis of Strong Presidential Rule – Citizens

| variables | b(s.e) |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| Sex | 0.079(1.735)** |
| Age | -0.039(.071) |
| Education | 0.006(1.566) |
| Ideology | 0.077(2.044)* |
| Political Party | 0.300(2.249)*** |
| Stratification | -0.009(1.783) |
| Government First/ Citizen First | -0.019(2.313) |
| Future Economic Prospect | 0.117(1.123)*** |
| Liberal Economic Dispositions | 0.120(.066)*** |
| Liberal Civil Assessment | 0.198(.048)*** |
| F-test | 43.690*** |
| r-square | 0.343 |

The regression analysis of the citizen survey data of 2014 concerning a strong presidential rule reveals the following results. First, the support is related to gender: men support more than women. Second, which political party a citizen supports yields a strong independent influence. Those who voted for the ruling (conservative) party in the presidential election in 2012 are clearly more in favor of a strong presidential rule than those who voted for the opposition (progressive) party. Third, ideological orientation is also important: Those with conservative orientation are found to be more in support of this presidential rule. Fourth, future economic prospect also works very significantly. More precisely, those who expect a better future than the past and the present clearly support such a presidential rule. It may sound strange why a promising future prospect should prompt an authoritarian change of the political rule towards a strong presidential leadership. It is contrary to the assumption that a desperate situation like poverty may work as a driving force of authoritarian political development. But what we have found is exactly the opposite. Why has this to be so? This is a question that I feel we have to deal with in the empirical study.

In this regard, it is quite instructive to examine the suggested regression analysis carefully. The key point is related to the strong independent influence of such variables as liberal economic disposition and liberal civil assessment, as can be found in <Table-8>. How is liberalism related to the support to a strong presidential rule? What is meant by liberal economic disposition is

that the support to a strong presidential rule increases proportionally as one becomes more committed to the principles of the market economy. In addition, what is meant by liberal civil assessment is that the support to a strong presidential rule increases proportionally as one assesses positively as to the extent of the realization of the basic civil and political rights in the country. The two statistical figures mean that the support to a strong presidential rule is significantly related to the indexes of liberalism. Why is this so? How can we explain it? An adequate logic of explanation is missing.

<Table-9> Four types of actors and the support to a strong president by citizens and MPs

| (100 as full score) | Politically Stabilized Neo-Liberal | Politically Stabilized Liberal Egalitarian | Politically Frustrated Economic Liberal | Politically Frustrated Egalitarian Populist | total | f-test |
|---------------------|------------------------------------|--|---|---|-------|-----------|
| MP | 31.2 | 22.2 | 32.4 | 7.8 | 20.3 | 9.145*** |
| Citizen | 63.8 | 57.0 | 44.6 | 32.2 | 43.3 | 66.900*** |

In this context, <Table-9> is revealing. It is also shocking to discover that the politically stabilized neo-liberal supports a strong president most strongly, followed by the politically stabilized liberal egalitarian. In contrast to this, the support to a strong president by the politically frustrated egalitarian populist is far less than the other groups. This can be explained as follows. The reason why neo-liberal supports a strong president is because of their anxiety, ambivalence, and fear which come from the populist challenges from the bottom and the lack of political stability and predictability, as an important condition for sustainable market economy. They tend to think that the chance for a better future which they possess, in fact, can be further improved if politics gains more stability and predictability. This dissatisfaction of the political reality tends to lead them to the support to a strong presidential rule as a way of getting out of the political uncertainty. This also represents a meaningful way for them to protect their interests and authority from the pressures from the bottom while keeping the country safe from the populist pressures.

Based on this, I want to argue that, as of 2014 when the survey research was conducted, the potential threat to democracy came from the neo-liberals who enjoy their status-quo, and from those who supported the ruling party with conservative ideology. I do not have any intention to generalize this interpretation. But this is what I have found from my empirical research of populism at the level of citizens' attitude and outlook. As of 2014, data analysis shows that the support to a strong president didn't come from the populist groups, but from the mainstream of neo-liberalism. Consequently, populism had nothing to do with the danger to democracy as evidenced by the fact that the politically frustrated egalitarian populist was far less in support of a strong president than other groups. <Table-10> demonstrates this point clearly.

<Table-10> Support to a Strong Presidential Leadership (unit: 100 as full score)

| Category | Subgroup | Score | f-test |
|-------------------------------|---|-------|------------|
| Supporting Political Party | Ruling Party | 58.1 | 287.918*** |
| | Opposition Party | 28.8 | |
| Ideological orientation | Conservative | 54.7 | 152.987*** |
| | Progressive | 33.5 | |
| Four types of political actor | Politically Stabilized Neo-Liberal | 63.8 | 66.900*** |
| | Politically Stabilized Liberal Egalitarian | 57 | |
| | Politically Frustrated Economic Liberal | 44.6 | |
| | Politically Frustrated Egalitarian Populist | 32.2 | |
| | Total | 43.3 | |

Furthermore, <Table-11> clearly shows how the group of the political frustrated egalitarian populists differs from other groups in terms of their party support and ideological orientation. The populist group is distinctive and sharply distinguished from neo-liberals who support the ruling party as well as a strong presidential rule. The differences among four types of political actors are so clear and consistent to repel the thesis of the populist threat to liberal democracy.

<Table 11> Four types of political actor by party support and ideological orientation

| (Unit: %) | Supporting Political Party | | Chi-Square |
|---|----------------------------|------------------|------------|
| | Ruling Party | Opposition Party | |
| Politically Stabilized Neo-Liberal | 81.7 | 18.3 | 168.620*** |
| Politically Stabilized Liberal Egalitarian | 61.5 | 38.5 | |
| Politically Frustrated Economic Liberal | 48.3 | 51.7 | |
| Politically Frustrated Egalitarian Populist | 27.7 | 72.3 | |
| (Unit: %) | Ideology | | Chi-Square |
| | Conservative | Progressive | |
| Politically Stabilized Neo-Liberal | 74.9 | 25.1 | 157.031*** |
| Politically Stabilized Liberal Egalitarian | 45.8 | 54.2 | |
| Politically Frustrated Economic Liberal | 52.1 | 47.9 | |
| Politically Frustrated Egalitarian Populist | 24.9 | 75.1 | |

Summary and Conclusion

As an empirical study, this paper starts from formulating conceptual schemes of populism. The base line is to define populism as opposed to professional politics (or elite democracy). At the level of the citizens' attitude, I define as populist those who distrust professional politics and advocate the role of people. Contrasted to this, those who continue to trust and follow professional politics are defined as a conventional group. Our empirical study shows that this divide yields many significant results. However, this divide alone is not enough to see the internal groups within populism and their consequences. Thus, our research goes further to link this divide to other two divides, that is, the divide of state versus public interest, and market versus welfare orientation. In this way, I have conceptually differentiates populism into four groups; 1) the power-oriented populism, 2) the public-oriented populism, 3) the market-

oriented populism, and 4) the welfare-oriented populism. Needless to say, this is only preliminary. There can be other approaches better qualified to grasp other types of populism (populist groups too). One may wonder how these conceptual types can be empirically identifiable. This issue is beyond the limit of this paper, but I don't see any difficulty in moving in that direction. In Korea, for instance, the *taeguggi* (the Korean national flag) rally and the candlelight rally, which were opposed to each other in 2017, may exemplify the power (state)-oriented and public-oriented populism respectively. In addition, the market-oriented populism can be seen in the national drive for apartment application deposit during the 1980s and 1990s whereas the welfare-oriented populism in the 'Gold-Collection Movement' during the 1997 IMF Financial Crisis or the so-called mad cow disease candlelight movement in 2007. However, this paper sets the primary question on how these types of populist groups differ from each other in terms of their demographic compositions and value orientations based on the analysis of the collected citizens' survey data.

With respect to the demographic characteristics, it turns out that 1) the public-oriented populists are more progressive, better educated, younger than the power-oriented populists whereas the power-oriented populists are older and slightly more occupied by the middle class. 2) This tendency has also been confirmed in the case of the conventional group except the variable of the middle class. 3) The welfare-oriented populists are definitely more progressive, better educated, and younger than the market-oriented populists. 4) This tendency has also been confirmed in the case of the conventional group. These findings point to a positive relation between the public-oriented and the welfare oriented populism. Yet it must be stressed that they are very different from the power-oriented and the market oriented populism respectively.

Concerning the socio-political outlook of these populist groups, data analysis shows the following results. 1) The welfare-oriented populists support most strongly the claim that the gap between poor and rich should be reformed radically while the market-oriented populist is lowest. The power-oriented and the public oriented populists stay in in-between, but their difference is marginal. 2) However, the perception of the state is twisted: Concerning the question about who are more responsible for individual life, the welfare-oriented populists stress state responsibility whereas the market-oriented populists consider individual responsibility more. The other two types of populists stay in the middle. 3) However, as to the questions whether the priority of development should be given to such social dimensions as state (community) or individual, the power-oriented and the market oriented populists go together ahead of the other two types of populism to support social dimension than individual. We need to think about what this means, particularly to the market-oriented populism.

Another set of questions dealt with in this paper is related to the danger that populism may pose to liberal democracy. This paper sets as a key issue in this regard the potential danger of a strong presidential role unbound by parliament and social pressure. This is an important issue particularly when a country faces serious economic crisis as we find today. The regression analysis shown in this paper demonstrates that the support to a strong presidential rule comes more from older people and low class as well as from those who possess the higher perception of social injustice in many different aspects of social life, and those who are more sensitive to

the influence of family background on the success of individuals. However, these findings are not directly related to the issue of populism. Thus, I have attempted to formulate four different types of political actor by combining two axes of liberalism, that is, political liberalism and economic liberalism. They are called in this paper: 1) politically stabilized neo-liberal, 2) politically stabilized liberal egalitarian, 3) politically frustrated economic liberal, and 4) politically frustrated egalitarian populist. This conceptual strategy permits me to examine whether the populist group supports a strong presidential rule or not, as an empirical problem.

The findings we show that the populist group is far from this. On the contrary, they are strongly opposed to it. The support comes far more from those who voted for the ruling party (as of 2014) and from those who identified themselves as conservative in terms of political orientation. Furthermore, the average point of support out of 100 maximum in the case of the politically stabilized neo-liberal is 63.8, whereas that of the politically stabilized liberal egalitarian is 57.0. In the case of the politically frustrated economic liberal, the score is 44.6, but it is only 32.2 in the case of the politically frustrated egalitarian populist. To prove this more clearly, I have looked into how this populist group differs from other groups in terms of party support and politically ideology. The results are as follows. 72.3 percent of the populist actors voted for the opposition party in the presidential election of 2012, whereas 81.7 percent of neo-liberals voted for the ruling party. 75.1 percent of the populist actors identify themselves as progressive whereas 74.9 percent of neo-liberals do so as conservative. The two other groups are located in in-between with considerable difference. These findings demonstrate that populism has nothing to do with the potential danger to liberal democracy if the danger means the support for a strong presidential rule. On the contrary, danger comes from those citizens who share neo-liberal attitudes. In this paper, I try to explain why this must be so in Korea as of 2014.

Finally, I want to conclude my presentation by reflecting on the question from which we started. What are the relations between populism and democracy? Does my analysis mean that populism does not pose any threat to democracy? I have no intention to claim it. Only what I can say is that as of 2014, with respect to the support for a strong presidential rule, populism is free from charge. But threats can be explored at other levels too. All depend on the theoretical and ideological positions one holds, and the meaning of democracy itself is far from being uniform. So we need to stretch our imagination. I have tried in this paper to reveal that the power-oriented populism may be more problematic to democracy than the public-oriented populism. To put it another way, the public-oriented populism, represented by the recent candlelight march, for example, can make significant contribution to enhancing democracy, whereas the power-oriented populism may work opposite. So we need to remain open and flexible not to miss the internal differentiations within populism.

■ 토론문 Discussions

Comments and Questions

Kim, Bi Hwan
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Before I begin, I would like to thank professor Han for inviting me for this occasion and allowing me to sit together with professor Dunn who was my postgraduate supervisor when I was in Cambridge. And especially I am very pleased to see that he is in good health enough to visit various places around the world to deliver lectures, and wish that he continue to be able to do so for long time.

Professor Dunn's presentation:

Both in contemporary political speech and in academic analytic analysis, the term populism is used mainly as a political accusation rather than as factual description. As one of the main causes of political pathologies that have haunted today's liberal democracy(competitive elitism, the rule of law and civic culture), populism has been accused of its destructive impacts on established electoral democracies and the rule of law, and its tendency to engender other malignant consequences such as the deepening of economic crisis and deterioration of public debt by government's irresponsible squandering of public resources.

Populism is not itself a sophisticated ideology with clear and distinct form, contents and tradition, and may include different things in line with the contextual change. The most important common features of populism are the division of "we, the people" and "they, the elites", its concomitant sense of political exclusion of "we, the people", and the belief that "they, the elites" are totally responsible for the present political and economic predicaments. And the accusation is mostly accompanied by the unfounded hope that only "the people" or their populist leaders can rescue the nation from the present predicaments.

Populism is not an autonomous causal force reconfiguring the future fate of human beings but an "externally caused outcome of cumulative pathologies in the routine politics of a particular society." From this, it follows that in order to successfully meet the challenge of populism, all governments concerned must govern very effectively not to lose people's support. The most dangerous challenge of populism is "the varying overt or concealed prospective consequences of its political triumph."

In between his presentation, professor Dunn gives a generally optimistic evaluation on the situation of the Republic of Korea, in which he finds no real grounds that might breed a strong populism. Instead he suggests a very instructive warning which is, I think, extremely timely and important. "The task of keeping democracy from danger is very different from the task of fighting fiercely for it in settings which it has never reached." I read this as follows in connection to Korean society: Populism can perform positive function in the period of democratic transition from authoritarian regime, but might perform negative functions in institutionalizing and maintaining established liberal democracy.

Let me turn to professor Han's presentation:

In theoretical or conceptual discussion on populism, professor Han's position is very much abridged but basically much alike professor Dunn's. I find his empirical survey on citizens' attitudes very interesting and important, especially the part concerning the internal diversity of populist group. His study reveals both that the size of the populist group is about 13% bigger than the size of the conventional group and that populist attitude is relatively evenly distributed among the left wing and the right wing populist groupings. I think that these facts have very important implications for the present and future politics in Korea. Concerning the future prospect of populism, similarly to professor Dunn's argument, he is cautious but basically optimistic because of its public-oriented character and rejective attitude toward imperial presidential system.

I have learned a lot about populism from two emeritus professors' presentations which are full of historical knowledge, insights, and wisdoms. I find the two presentations very much complementary to each other, cooperating well together to illuminate both some common features of populism and the particularity of Korean populism.

It is widely accepted that populism is a parasitic ideology that needs other major sophisticated ideologies such as nationalism and socialism in order for it to work effectively as a political tool or strategy. And because it is basically a political phenomenon deeply rooted in particular political, economic, cultural context, the commonality of various forms of populism is very formal and superficial, such as the division between "the pure people" and "the corrupt elites", hatred of political corruptions committed by immoral elites, and sense of economic deprivation of ordinary people. Populists tend to argue that the elites are doing their best to multiply their wealth at the expense of the people's legitimate share, frequently defending the interests of foreign companies than their own country.

I find two professors' presentations mostly in line with common wisdom, and so I have no special questions about their presentations. So, I would like ask some other related questions. The first is concerning the structural limitation of liberal democracy as a form of democracy, the second is about the inherent weaknesses of populist democracy, and the last one is concerning the future prospect of democracy in Korea?

While most advocates of liberal democracy prefer the rule of law and constitutional government to the self-determination of the people, progressive or radical democrats tend to consider liberal democracy as an incomplete democracy which encourages elected representatives to be both irresponsible for their judgment and action and irresponsive to peoples felt needs and voices. They think that liberal democracy tends to encourage major parties to unite into a cartel to permanently rule their society alternately, actually excluding the vast majority of people from political process. For more radical democrats, liberal democracy is nothing but a halfway democracy that is itself managed by some privileged elites who are easily inclined to be morally and political corrupt. So, in case that liberal democracy is combined with neo-liberal trend of global order, it is highly likely to boost the polarization of global order and national society, making the life condition of the vast majority of ordinary people worse and worse. According to them, only a populist form of democracy is genuine democracy true to its name. So my question is this: Considering the general condition and capacity of contemporary liberal democracy, which has engendered various populist challenges in the first place, is it realistically possible to liberal democracy can cope with today's populist challenges without some fundamental structural change? In other words, is it possible to make

political elites to be more responsible for their judgment and action and more responsive to citizens' felt needs and voices without main institutional structure of liberal democracy being reformed?

My second question is as follows: is populist democracy inherently inferior to liberal democracy? If it were, in what aspects is it inferior? In light of the high level of education of ordinary people and the superiority of collective intelligence or Condorcet's law of big number, some familiar old warnings of the dangers of popular democracy seem to be unfounded and even anachronistic. Was there no case that populist democracy had performed relatively successfully for fairly long time? As far as I know, all forms of democracy true to its name are basically populist. Liberal democracy is no exception. Its legitimacy derives ultimately from the people's consent. All governments in liberal democracy govern in the name of the people. There is only a difference in degree of populism between different forms of democracy. Yes, we know intuitively which regime is more populist and which regime is not. But how can we exactly distinguish between populist democracy and non-populist one? As professor Dunn aptly pointed out, isn't the accumulation of governmental failures in liberal democracy the main cause that has activated the populist elements inherent in all forms of democracy?

And apart from this, is there no possibility to make populist democracy more viable, durable and efficient? And isn't it possible to devise a hybrid democracy combining liberal representative democracy and populist democracy? (Or is it not allowed for us to activate populist elements and reduce elitist aspect of liberal democracy?) Do we have to make an either/or choice between them?

My last question is about the future role of populism in Korean politics. Considering the whole tumultuous history of Korean politics since the independence, I firmly believe that the people played a major role both in bringing down several authoritarian regimes and in establishing democratic governments, as you all witnessed the candlelight movement two years ago. People's united power and movement has been the main driving force of democratization process and it also has played a decisive role in establishing the rule of law. Without people's democratic movement, there would have been no democracy and no rule of law in Korea. In light of the recent political history of Korea, it is easy to see that only strong democracy can secure the rule of law. Because of this, I think that a realistically ideal form of democracy for present Korea is a hybrid democracy combining liberal democracy and some populist democratic elements. Of course, this form of democracy will need some supportive civic virtues of Korean citizens.

Professor Han's findings that the progressive populist grouping upholds a moderate presidential system and the rule of law, that the size of the conservative populist group is just as same as the size of progressive counterpart, and that the size of the conventional group is a bit smaller than that of populist group, seem to have very important implications for Korean democracy. It is likely that check and balance between the conventional group and the populist group, and between conservative subgroup and progressive subgroup within populist group will stabilize the hypothetical hybrid democracy minimizing the potential danger of populist elements. May I ask professor Han about more viable form of democracy suitable for Korean society? Which one do we have to pursue between pure liberal democracy and hybrid one?

■ 토론문 Discussions

Populism and Democracy

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Dunn in the paper discusses what populism means to democracy in the contemporary politics. He argues that populism is a strong potential threat to democracy because it may legitimize the collapse of competitive electoral democracy through the choice of the people itself. He properly observes populist phenomena in the history of the West highlighting Brexit and Trumpism. At a relatively general level, he warns against unexpected rise of populist phenomena even in advanced democracies.

My main concern with Dunn's paper is the notion of populism as a research variable. Dunn defines populism as "democracy with foreseeably malignant consequences." Though he acknowledges that populism varies across time and place, he does not provide concrete criteria on which what regimes or policies may be considered to represent populism. This is partly because he focuses on the threat of populism and its worst consequences, and just moves onto conditions in which populism is likely to create such negative consequences. Thus, it seems to me that, in Dunn's discussion, populism becomes, or may be called, real populism only after it actually incurs visible damages to electoral democracy. From this approach, the only inarguable current populist regime is the Maduro administration of Venezuela, which satisfies his definition of full populist threat: "the durable establishment of an uninhibitedly authoritarian government, intent on dismantling the structure of civil and political liberties and displacing the rule of law by the arbitrary distribution of punishments and rewards on its own behalf by the ruling power." As Dunn mainly pays attention to the degree of danger that populism presents, which is intensely contextual, a populist regime may or may not be populist depending on the degree of the danger that it actually causes afterwards. The degree of danger as a criterion, however, is not clear, either. These unclear criteria for populism make identification of populism or populist regimes more subjective.

In a similar vein, it is not very clear whether Dunn talks about the threat of populism, populist regimes or populist policies. He does not distinguish populism vs. populist, and also populist regimes vs. populist policies. First, populism is an ideology which may be concretized only by certain political actors, who may be called populist. Therefore, the term 'populism' mainly indicates a general tendency or phenomena at the conceptual level whereas the term 'populist' focuses more on real actions and actors and therefore better reflects the dynamic and fluid nature of politics and politicians. Though populism and populist may be used interchangeably to some extent, the level of discussion on populism and populist may differ due to such difference of focus. Likewise, populist regimes and populist policies may suggest quite different meanings as the former refer to actors themselves that are considered populist by and large and the latter are policies with populist traits regardless of the overall character of the

implementing actors. Dunn, however, seems not to pay much attention to the difference. It seems that he is not so much interested in kinds of policies as in whether the policies generate unexpected or 'abnormal' electoral consequences by mobilizing the people.

Dunn's insufficient attention to the aforementioned distinction may be partly because he focuses on cases of right-wing populism in the contemporary West such as Britain's Brexit referendum and the election of President Trump. It seems that in these cases the fundamental characteristics of the actors that faced or incurred populist phenomena are less important than the surprising outcomes themselves in the democratic elections. This approach, however, should be modified when it comes to the cases of Latin America, where populist regimes or policies are predominantly and overtly left-wing. If not dating back to the heyday of classical populism in the mid-20th century, contemporary populism in Latin America is heavily associated with the Pink Tide in the 2000s, or the 'turn to the Left' of major Latin American countries, and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela is the first and prominent example. Of course, in Latin America the advent of leftist populist regimes through election is meaningful as it introduced authoritarian rule in some countries. What is more important, however, is that in many other cases the leftist or center-leftist populist regimes improved the 'substantive' aspect of democracy by reducing inequality or at least by making such efforts. For instance, an anti-poverty program called conditional cash transfer(CCT) spread in many Latin American countries in the 2000s, and this program significantly, if not dramatically, improved the life of the extreme poor. This program is sometimes criticized for serving as a populist apparatus, but it is true that it produced positive outcomes when it comes to the quality of democracy assessed through changes in people's life and their human capability, through reduction of poverty and through empowerment of the socially vulnerable. In fact, the CCT has been adopted across Latin America, regardless of political or ideological orientation of the regimes, thanks to the positive outcomes of some early major CCT cases within the region. In this sense, in Latin America which is often characterized with a failing economy or society, populism, populist regimes and populist policies should be taken as something more than just electoral upheaval and as potential practical tools that may bear positive consequences in democracy.

Lastly, one small doubt about Dunn's compliment to Korea occurs to me. He appreciates the current Republic of Korea as a case that successfully avoided or at least staved off the threat of populism because it is "so plainly neither a failing economy nor a failing society." This appreciation is not wrong in terms of Korea's macroeconomic performances and socioeconomic stability in comparison with the Third World such as Latin America. Still, as he emphasizes the blighting and collapse of local economies and the rapidly increasing concentration of wealth and income as important conditions boosting the danger of populism, many Korean people may not agree that Korea is an exception to the double misfortune.

Han's paper about populism is more empirical than Dunn's. Han explores heterogeneous populist and non-populist attitudes of the people and their particular characteristics that promote or hinder democracy. In so doing, he approaches to populism not in terms of leaders or implementers but in terms of subjects or targets. Thus, he categorizes the people into several groups with distinct characteristics and examines which group of people tends to respond to populism most in favor of or against democracy. In this sense, Han does not investigate populism per se but ways in which populism is perceived, mediated and reacted to by the people.

My initial concern about Han's paper mainly lies in the complicated categorization of citizens with insufficient explanation. In the first place, Han does not clearly explicate by what criteria citizens are divided into the populist group and the conventional group. The unexplained cut-off point between the two groups would have to be justified. Also, I wonder why variables of supporting political party(ruling party vs. opposition party) and ideology(conservative vs. moderate vs. progressive) are excluded from the regression analysis of the populist attitudes(Table2). These two variables are included in the demographic composition of citizen survey data(Table 1), but they are left out in the regression analysis. The two variables may be very significant when it comes to the attitudes of citizens toward populism.

In a similar vein, when Han introduces new variables of state interests vs. public interests and market orientation vs. welfare orientation into the categories of populist vs. conventional, I think he could have better assessed the significance of different variables by conducting a regression analysis including ideology(conservative vs. moderate vs. progressive). Han uses the 2 sets of 4 groups as a means to show the heterogeneity of populist groups. However, the same result may indicate that the attitude of citizens toward populism is not significant holding constant the new variables. That is, what Han finds may be interpreted quite differently. The reason why I suggest the possibility of the different interpretation is the two questions that Han asks about nuclear power plants and North Korea's atomic bomb development. These two questions are about national security, and the answers to them are likely to depend not so much on respondents' populist attitudes as on their political ideology, which may function as a mechanism between the two new variables on one hand and the answers to the two questions on the other. I suspect this may become more clear if a regression analysis is conducted with all the variables.

The aforementioned ambiguity may come from what Han already acknowledges, which is lack of theoretical reasoning about the new variables and the relevant conceptual categories. Han has yet to provide what they actually mean at the theoretical level as well as empirical level. I believe that they have to do with the concept of (neo)liberalism, which he brings up in the next section. In the current version of the paper, however, he does not elucidate what the categories he created actually signify in the sense of (neo)liberalism. He could have done this task as he moves onto the next section, but he leaves it aside and shifts to the issue of populist threat to democracy.

As for major overall arguments, Han comes to a conclusion which is the opposite to Dunn's conclusion regarding the relation between populism and democracy. While Dunn assumes that populism features strong threats to democracy, Han argues that populism does not endanger democracy but has little to do with decline of democracy. Of course, it may not be appropriate to directly compare and contrast their arguments because their analyses are based on very discrete designs and levels and do not quite communicate each other. However, it is interesting that Dunn's argument well explains the cases of the West whereas Han's explains the Korean case well. Then, are they generalizable beyond their main research population? In Latin America, populist citizens, most of whom are devoid of vested interests, have tended to support strong presidential leadership, if not dictatorship at all, because they want their strong populist presidents to overturn the long-standing and deeply rooted social, political and economic inequality. The problem is that the populist presidents are fairly authoritarian in some cases and

cause reverse discrimination against the middle class and above. Though the case of Venezuela is an exceptionally extreme case, populism may well be perceived undemocratic by anti-populist citizens or neoliberal citizens. Still, it is too simplistic to equate strong presidential leadership itself to loss of democracy. In most Latin American countries, populism or populist regimes or policies depending on the situations have appreciated or encouraged strong presidential leadership but have not incurred particular threats to democracy, still less demolished electoral democracy *per se*.

Finally, I find some minor points unclear or problematic. First, the 5 survey questions about populist attitudes seems a bit problematic. I am not sure whether it is a problem of translation across different languages, but the set of 5 survey questions that Han presents are not quite the same as 8 survey questions about populist attitudes I have found in Andreadis & Stavrakakis(2017, Appendix p6), though both are claimed to be from the Greek Voter Study 2015. Again this might be from translation problem across languages, but it seems that the 8 survey questions in Andreadis & Stavrakakis(2017, Appendix p6) are clearer. Apart from this issue, the second question of the 5 survey questions seems inadequate or reversed. The item reads “Most Politicians are trustworthy,” and the answer “strongly agree” is supposed to indicate ‘strongly populist’ according to the answer scale for the rest 4 questions. It actually means the opposite, however, judging from the content of the question 2. Similarly, the second question related to free market vs. egalitarianism seems reversely put on the answer scale. “Private ownership of business and industry should be increased” and “Government ownership of business and industry should be increased” should switch sides to be consistent with the other two questions on the answer scale. Finally, the variable of supporting political party(ruling party vs. opposition party) seems redundant and possibly misleading. Han uses data collected from Seoul citizens in 2014 and 2018, and ‘fortunately’ the data for 2018 is missing supporting political party. What may be problematic is that the ruling party changed from a conservative party to a progressive party between the two points in time. Therefore, in the 2014 data, “ruling party” in supporting political party and “conservative” in ideology represent basically the same meaning. If the 2018 data included the variable of supporting political party, this could erroneously result in the finding opposite to the finding from the 2014 data.



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